Friday, April 28, 2006

Lodi Terrorism Trial—Jury Pressure

When the guilty verdict against was announced on Tuesday afternoon, Mr. Hayat’s attorney said that “this fight is not over.”[1] It certainly seems that is the case as one of the jurors has come forward, claiming that the jury foreman “was racist, and he harassed [her] until she changed her mind.”[2]

Arcelia Lopez wrote a seven-page affidavit in which she “said the foreman decided the case before he heard the evidence and commented on media coverage of the Lodi man’s terrorism trial. On the second day of the nine-week trial, he ‘gestured as if he was tying a rope around his neck and then pulling the rope in an upward motion’ and said, ‘Hang him.’”[3] This affidavit was included in the defense’s motion for a new trial, the argument for which is jury misconduct.[4]

The motion, which the defense hopes will be addressed this afternoon, contains allegations that “the foreman made ‘racial slurs’ during deliberations, at one point saying ‘that they all look alike. If you put them in the same costume then they all look alike.’ A black juror said the comment was inappropriate and another asked the foreman to apologize; he later did so.”[5] Ms. Lopez also said that a local newspaper was in the jury room, concerns about which were brushed aside.[6]

She also seems to have been “the only one who thought Hamid Hayat was not guilty. The foreman accused her of not having the ‘mental capacity to understand’ the case and told Lopez she should ‘process the evidence with a slant toward guilt,’ Lopez wrote.”[7] Of course, the standard is supposed to be “innocent until proven guilty.”

During the reading of the verdicts, Ms. Lopez “was visibly upset,” and that, combined with the foreman's note to the judge, made the defense “suspect that one juror had been holding out.”[8]

One juror, speaking to the San Francisco Chronicle on condition of anonymity, said that when Ms. Lopez “decided to change her vote, which was completely under her own will, I asked her flat-out to her face, in front of everybody, if she was changing her mind based on her own free will and the evidence presented to the jury, … She said yes.”[9]

After a verdict is read in court, the court may poll the jury, either on motion of a party or on its own volition.[10] If the poll reveals a lack of unanimity, the court may direct the jury to deliberate further or may declare a mistrial and discharge the jury.[11] There was indeed such a jury poll conducted by Judge Burrell, and “though emotional, [Ms.] Lopez confirmed her guilty vote in open court.”[12]

A motion for a new trial can be granted upon the defendant’s motion if the interest of justice so requires.[13] If the motion is to be made on the grounds of newly discovered evidence, the defense has three years after the verdict to file the motion for a new trial, but if an appeal is pending, the court may not grant a motion for a new trial until the appellate court remands the case.[14] A motion for a new trial on any other reason must be filed with 7 days of the verdict.[15]

New trials based on jury misconduct can be difficult to obtain. “Post-trial jury scrutiny is disfavored because of its potential to undermine ‘full and frank discussion in the jury room, jurors’ willingness to return an unpopular verdict, and the community’s trust in a system that relies upon the decisions of laypeople.’”[16] It takes en extraordinary circumstance for a court to “inquire into the deliberative process of juries,” with the sole exception being “extraneous influences that may have improperly influenced the verdict.”[17] “Extraneous influences” includes “publicity received and discussed in the jury room, consideration by the jury of evidence not admitted in court, and communications or other contact between jurors and third persons.”[18] Intra-jury harassment, intimidation, or other such influences, however, “is not competent to impeach a verdict.”[19]

Furthermore, a court’s inquiry into a jury’s deliberative process is tempered by the provisions of Rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which states that “a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment concerning the juror's mental processes in connection therewith.” The only exception is that the juror may testify as to “whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror.”[20]



[1] See Don Thompson, , Associated Press (via San Francisco Examiner), Apr. 26, 2006.
[2] Layla Bohm, , Lodi News-Sentinel, Apr. 27, 2006.
[3] Id.
[4] Id.
[5] Id.
[6] Id.
[7] Id.
[8] Id.
[9] Demian Bulwa, , San Francisco Chronicle, Apr. 28, 2006.
[10] Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 31(d).
[11] Id.
[12] Don Thompson, , Associated Press (via San Francisco Examiner), Apr. 28, 2006.
[13] Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 33(a).
[14] Id. 33(b)(1).
[15] Id. 33(b)(2).
[16] United States v. Morrow, 412 F. Supp. 2d 146, 165 (D.D.C. 2006).
[17] Id.
[18] Id.
[19] Id.
[20] See Id. at 165-66.