Thursday, June 22, 2006

Terrorism Definition—Canada

As we have pointed out from time to time, part of the problem with prosecuting is the definition of the term. For example, we a couple of months ago, that Turkey has taken a very expansive approach to the definition, including such activities as carrying pictures and banners, or shouting slogans.

Canada is now exploring the idea of “proposing amendments to Canada’s terrorism laws that would broaden the definition of terrorism.”[1] Specifically, Justice Minister Vic Toews would change “the definition of terrorism under s.83.01 of the Criminal Code by deleting the requirement that acts or omissions be carried out ‘in whole or in part for political, religious or ideological purpose, objective or cause.’”[2] This would have a drastic effect. As the law stands now terrorism is defined as a violent act that is committed with those purposes, and which is intended to intimidate the public, or to compel a person or organization to do to refrain from doing any act.[3] Thus, stripping out that language, would make any violent and intimidating act, an act of terrorism.

And that is not an unintended consequence. “The reason for dropping what is now an essential ingredient in making an act or omission one of terrorism is that criminal organizations could be prosecuted under Canada’s terrorism laws. The Hells Angels were specifically mentioned as a group that would [be] highlighted for prosecution under [the] revamped terrorism law.”[4]

Comparing gang activity to terrorist activity is a growing activity, and Minister Toews stated that “the water is muddied between gangs and terrorist organizations, which [allegedly] now partner internationally to finance their nefarious activities. … ‘We are dealing with crime that has international ramifications and that terrorist organizations are often working together with gangs in order to raise money.’”[5]

So, from a rational standpoint, perhaps it makes sense to take ideology out of the equation when defining terrorism; a population is no less-terrorized if the terror is committed with absence of any particular ideological bent. But terrorism’s definition is somewhat akin to the Supreme Court’s obscenity bon mot: we know it when we see it, and there is something fundamentally unsound in equating gang violence to ideological warfare, and using the same definition to describe both acts. Accusing a person of terrorism should only be done when the act justifies it, not when it is politically expedient to do so.



[1] Arthur Weinreb, , Canadian Free Press, Jun. 22, 2006.
[2] Id. (emphasis in original).
[3] Criminal Code Act R.S. c. C-46 (1985).
[4] Weinreb, supra note 1.
[5] Kathleen Harris, , 24 Hours (Vancouver), Jun. 21, 2006.